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Non-technical summary
Over the past years, the global economy has seen an unprecedented deepening of financial markets.
Between 1990 and 2006, the total outstanding amount in global equity markets increased sixfold, from USD 6 trillion to USD 40 trillion. Even when scaled by global GDP, the increase in global stock market capitalisation is remarkable, from around 30 to over 80 percent of GDP. This financial deepening has been accompanied by even more strongly growing cross-border holdings of financial assets. In the case of portfolio equity assets, cross-border positions increased more than twenty-fold, from USD 0.7 trillion in 1990 to USD 14 trillion in 2006.
These two trends, financial deepening and growing internationalisation of financial asset holdings, have profound implications for the global economy. One such implication is that financial investors benefit from improved opportunities for portfolio diversification. Cross-border diversification reduces the exposure of investors to domestic financial markets and thus provides opportunities to smooth returns. This financial phenomenon of cross-border portfolio diversification has a macroeconomic flip-side, related to cross-border risk sharing. Risk sharing in a macroeconomic sense refers, in a country context, to the possibility for economic agents and for consumers in particular to reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risks arising from country-specific output shocks, and to effectively share these risks with consumers in other countries. Clearly, cross-border financial holdings offer one channel to achieve such macroeconomic risk sharing. A number of stylised models indeed show that complete financial markets may allow, under certain assumptions, for perfect consumption risk sharing, such that the path of consumption over time is not correlated with the path of domestic output.
A rich empirical literature shows that perfect risk sharing does not hold in the real world. Some empirical contributions find output growth to be actually more highly correlated across countries than consumption growth, a phenomenon known as the consumption correlations puzzle or the quantity anomaly. Recent work has confirmed that the degree of risk sharing remains far from perfect but has nevertheless increased over time. Some authors document an increase in risk sharing during the second half of the 1990s and in the early-2000s. They attribute this mainly to the growing internationalisation of portfolios as manifested by a declining home bias of financial investors.
What remains, however, largely unexplored are the concrete operational channels through which risk sharing operates. For most financial instruments, including portfolio equity which is the investment category reviewed in this paper, there are two distinct channels of returns. The first one is the investment income channel, which works through dividend payments as recorded in the income balance of the balance of payments. These payments accrue to the disposable income of investors and may therefore be used directly for consumption smoothing. The second channel is the capital gains channel, which reflects changes in the price of the financial assets expressed in the domestic currency of the investor. While such capital gains do not generate an immediate stream of financial flows and are not recorded in the balance of payments, they may have an impact on saving and investment decisions through wealth effects and thereby promote consumption smoothing. The potential importance of the second channel, i.e. the capital gains channel, has been underscored in the theoretical literature on valuation effects, but its empirical relevance has so far not been examined systematically.
This paper examines the potential role of net investment income and net capital gains channel for consumption risk sharing, with a specific focus on international portfolio equity holdings. It uses a newly constructed dataset on capital gains and investment income for 35 industrial and emerging market economies with up to 35 years of data for most countries. The dataset covers over 90 percent of global stock market capitalisation.
Our main finding is that the net capital gain channel appears to be more important than the net investment income channel for risk sharing through portfolio equity holdings. This assessment is based on a two-step analysis. In a first step, we examine the cyclical behaviour of net capital gains and net investment income. For risk sharing to operate, net capital gains and net investment income should be countercyclical, i.e. in the event of a negative idiosyncratic shock to domestic output, a country should benefit from positive net capital gains and from positive net investment income flows. We find that this cyclicality property holds for net capital gains, either scaled to domestic GDP or using implied real rates of capital gains, but not for net investment income. In a second step, we look at consumption risk sharing behaviour by estimating a traditional risk sharing equation that examines co-movements between real consumption and real output. We augment this equation with cyclicality measures of net capital gains and net investment income and find that countries with more countercyclical net capital gains experience better consumption risk sharing.
These risk sharing properties of net capital gains apply mainly in our subsample of industrial countries. In emerging market economies, by contrast, results do not hold for both steps of the analysis, i.e. net capital gains do not behave in the required countercyclical way and they do not seem to have an influence on actual consumption risk sharing. This suggests that financial globalisation has so far led to asymmetric benefits globally, in that industrial countries are able to smooth consumption more easily via the capital gains channel, whereas emerging market economies do not seem to benefit from such risk sharing.
Another finding relates to the existence of clear patterns over time. In both steps of the analysis, we find net capital gains to have increasing countercyclicality over time, with a marked increase in estimated coefficients in particular since the mid-1990s. The analysis highlights that two separate factors may help explain this increase in the potential role of capital gains as a hedge against country-specific shocks, namely (i) a generalised decline in home bias and (ii) a deepening of stock markets across most countries.
Introduction
Global financial integration has proceeded rapidly over the past decades. Lewis (1996) , who find output growth to be actually more highly correlated across countries than consumption growth (consumption correlations puzzle or quantity anomaly). Recent work has confirmed that the degree of risk sharing remains far from perfect, but has nevertheless increased over time.
What remains, however, largely unexplored are the concrete operational channels through which risk sharing operates. For most financial instruments, including portfolio equity which is the investment category reviewed in this paper, there are two distinct channels of returns: the first one is the investment income channel, taking the form of dividend payments in the case of portfolio equity. Investment income is recorded in the income balance of the balance of payments, accrues to the disposable income of investors and may be used directly for consumption. The second channel is the capital gains channel, which reflects changes in the price of the financial assets expressed in the domestic currency of the investor. Capital gains may therefore result from changes in the market price of the asset as well as from changes in exchange rates. In the case of portfolio equity, capital gains include the effect of retained earnings, i.e. earnings that are not paid out in the form of dividends but that affect the valuation of the company. Such capital gains do not generate an immediate stream of financial flows and are not recorded in the balance of payments. They may nevertheless, through wealth effects, have an impact on saving and investment decisions and thereby promote consumption smoothing.
There are no strong priors in support of the investment income channel or the capital gain channel as the dominant mode through which risk sharing takes place. Arguably, the importance of one or the other channel may differ on the specific financial instrument at hand. Generally, one main argument in support of the investment income channel is that income allows to smooth consumption directly, as it forms part of disposable income, in contrast with capital gains that can have only indirect wealth effects on consumption. At the same time, available empirical evidence shows that, for the financial instrument under consideration, i.e. portfolio equity, capital gains are much larger in size than investment income, which would support capital gains as a potentially more important channel.
There has been limited empirical analysis on these two channels of risk sharing. The income channel has received some attention, in particular by Lane (2001) , who analyses international investment income flows and finds limited evidence in support of such flows as a potential source of income smoothing at business cycle frequencies, and by Artis and Hoffmann (2006) Our main finding is that, for risk sharing through portfolio equity holdings, the capital gain channel appears to be more potent than the investment income channel. Moreover, we find that the risk sharing properties of equity generally hold better for industrial countries than for emerging market economies. In somewhat more detail, our results can be grouped in three points:
• In the first step, checking the cyclicality properties of capital gains and income, we find clear evidence that net capital gains are countercyclical and thus offer a potential insurance against idiosyncratic output shocks in the domestic economy. Such countercyclicality is found for rates of net capital gains (which are essentially the difference between rates of capital gains on foreign assets and liabilities) and for the overall size of net capital gains (as captured by capital gains divided by domestic GDP). For the latter measure, the potential for insurance has increased markedly over time, especially since the mid-1990s. For investment income (dividends), results are more mixed, with limited evidence that they act as a buffer against output shocks. The potential for risk sharing through portfolio equity is found to be existing only for industrial countries.
• Refining this first-stage analysis, our analysis highlights two separate factors that may help explain the increase in the potential role of capital gains as a hedge against country-specific shocks, namely (i) a generalised decline in home bias and (ii) a deepening of stock markets across most countries.
• Finally, in the second step, we find that countries with more countercyclical net capital gains on portfolio equity also experience more consumption risk sharing. When augmenting the traditional risk sharing estimation with cyclicality measures of capital gains, we find that more countercyclical net capital gains also imply a higher degree of consumption smoothing.
This result again holds only for industrial countries, but not for emerging market economies.
This suggests that financial globalisation leads to asymmetric benefits globally: Industrial countries are able to smooth consumption more easily via the capital gains channel, whereas emerging market economies do not benefit from such risk sharing.
One implication of these results concerns the effect of exchange rate fluctuations. Capital gains, expressed in domestic currency of the investor, consist of a pure return-driven component and an exchange rate-driven component. Available data do not allow to disentangle these two components for a broad range of countries. 1 However, the fact that our results on the risk sharing properties of capital gains also hold on the liabilities side could suggest that currency movements do not play a dominant role in our results. This is because equity liabilities, that is equity held by foreign investors, are typically denominated in domestic currency and are hence not directly affected by exchange rate fluctuations from a domestic viewpoint.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next Section discusses the motivation of the paper in the context of the existing literature. Section 3 presents our dataset. The two legs of the empirical analysis, namely the cyclicality of capital gains and income and its effect on consumption risk sharing, are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
Motivation and literature overview
By reviewing the role of capital gains as opposed to investment income as a risk sharing channel, this paper stands at the cross-road of an established literature on consumption risk sharing and a more recent strand of work on capital gains and valuation effects. We briefly review these two strands of research and present our contributions to them.
Literature on consumption risk sharing
Several theoretical contributions elaborate the benchmark case for risk sharing through financial markets. Workhorse models have been developed, inter alia, by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) . These model have a number of testable implications. One implication is that cross-country correlations of consumption growth should be above cross-country correlations of output growth. Another implication is that, within a given country, consumption growth should be less volatile than output growth, as risk sharing should allow to smooth consumption in the face of output shocks. Initial empirical work testing for these implications, for instance by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and Lewis (1996) , found the degree of risk sharing to be very low or even negative. This feature of the data is known as the consumption correlation puzzle (consumption growth less correlated than output growth, whereas it should be more highly correlated according to theory) or quantity anomaly. 2 Various extensions of this empirical work, during the era of very strongly increasing international financial integration. The main contribution we add to this literature is our examination of the specific channels through which risk sharing operates, as we examine the respective roles of income flows (dividends) and capital gains on international equity portfolios. We deliberately adopt a broader angle by examining capital gains for a broad cross-section of countries.
Literature on capital gains on international portfolios
3 Data compilation and empirical regularities
Data compilation
We build a comprehensive dataset for 35 countries with annual data between 1970 and 2005. In contrast to most research in the area so far, we focus on a rather broad range of countries, including 18 industrial countries and 17 emerging market economies (EMEs). 3 The country selection is essentially driven by data quality and consistency requirements. We keep from an original sample of over 100 countries only those series that display no unusual breaks and that have at least 10 years of continuously available data. Despite these strict selection criteria, the remaining sample of 35 countries is a very representative part of the global economy, covering 92 percent of global stock market capitalisation and of 94 percent of global cross-border holdings of portfolio equity. 4 Data for investment income can be obtained either directly from statistical sources (we used the IMF's International Financial Statistics) or can be computed indirectly by applying dividend yields from market index portfolios on outstanding stocks of foreign equity assets and liabilities.
Our dataset comprises data on the basis of both methodologies, i.e. direct measures of income and indirect measures of income applying dividend returns (taken from Datastream) on outstanding stocks (as defined below). 5 We compute both approaches to check for consistency, but use the direct measures in our empirical estimations.
Specifically, net income in year t equals:
where IN C A t and IN C L t are annual investment income flows on equity assets and liabilities, i A t and 3 Some authors also include non-industrial countries in their sample, for instance Obstfeld (1994) , Lewis (1999) , and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007). See Table 1 for the complete country list. 4 These figures exclude data on Luxembourg, which has very sizeable cross-border equity holdings but is not included in the dataset. 5 One complication with the indirect method is that i 
where F lowA t and F lowL t are capital outflows and inflows of portfolio equity. For example for foreign liabilities, one can calculate real rates of capital gains as follows:
where π t refers to the CPI inflation rate. The rate of net capital gains is defined as the differential between the rate of capital gains on foreign assets and the rate of capital gains on foreign liabilities.
Our dataset also includes net total returns, which are equal to the sum of net income flows and net capital gains:
On a more general level, also reinvested earnings and undistributed profits are an important part of financial returns. Retained earnings can potentially be an important driver of capital gains, as they increase the market value of a company listed on the stock market. 10 We closely scrutinise these data with regard to outliers and potential breaks. However, data on portfolio equity are rather reliable and robust which was also an essential reason for us to focus
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September 2008 on this category (next to the various theoretical arguments given above). The data in their raw form are US-dollar based. We transform them using IFS data on bilateral spot exchange rates. It is crucial for this calculation to employ year-end exchange rates for stock data and yearly average rates for flow data.
Our dataset also contains the cyclical component of real GDP growth and of real private consumption growth. Real GDP and real private consumption data are taken from different sources, including the IMF's International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook and the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts. Where possible, we computed growth rates on the basis of fourthquarter data (e.g., the growth rate for 2006 compares 2006Q4 with 2005Q4 data) rather than yearly average growth rates as conventionally done. This is in our view essential to ensure consistency with the income and capital gains data, which are derived from end-of-year outstanding stocks.
We apply the same method to the calcualtion of CPI inflation rates. We use an HP-filter to obtain the cyclical components of GDP and consumption growth. 11 For our analysis, we also need data on real GDP growth in the rest of the world. To generate this rate carefully, we do not rely on global GDP growth figures, but compute rest-of-the-world GDP growth for each country individually, using GDP levels in US dollar terms as weights. Our dataset is completed with stock market capitalisation data from Datastream.
Some empirical regularities from our dataset
Our dataset allows to present some first insights in the development of international equity holdings and the associated income flows and capital gains. To start with, the data confirm the very rapid (Figure 2 ). An interesting feature of the data is that capital gains are, on average, far higher than investment income. In 2005, capital gains were roughly 11 In line with Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the smoothing parameter λ at 6.25 for our annual data.
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ten times as high as investment flows. At first glance, this would suggest that capital gains may potentially play a much more important role than income flows as a channel for income smoothing.
Yet, this first impression could potentially be misleading: income flows generate an immediate transfer of resources that can be used one-for-one for consumption or investment purposes, whereas capital gains generate only a change in wealth and have therefore only an indirect impact on consumption through wealth effects. The relative importance of capital gains vis-à-vis income flows for income smoothing purposes can therefore not be directly read from Figure 2 , but should be determined on the basis of the empirical analysis below.
It is interesting to compare international capital gains with domestic capital gains. In principle, it could be that the capital gains on international portfolios are completely dwarfed by the gains that equity investors make on their domestic portfolios. Finally, we present some country-specific data in Table 1 
The cyclicality of capital gains and income flows
As a first step of our risk sharing analysis, we examine the cyclical properties of capital gains and income flows on portfolio equity. This allows to check for a key prerequisite of risk sharing, namely 12 Precise definitions of these two home bias measures are provided in Section 4.4.
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September 2008 whether net capital gains and net income are countercyclical. Such cyclicality is indicated by the sign and magnitude of the reaction of capital gains and net income to swings in domestic relative to global output. We also analyse developments over time and explore whether the potential for risk sharing is influenced by the degree of home bias in international portfolios as well as the depth of financial markets.
Estimation strategy
The first step of the empirical analysis consists of estimating the co-movement between output shocks, on the one hand, and capital gains and income flows, on the other hand. Consider the case of net capital gains: The mechanism of international risk-sharing implies that a country experiencing a positive shock to its output (relative to the rest of the world) would incur net capital losses. Conversely, an economy that is relatively underperforming should receive net capital gains. To check this empirically, we estimate a panel regression based on the following equation:
where kg it are net capital gains and y it − y * it is the difference between domestic and foreign real GDP growth, for a given country i and year t. Equivalent equations are estimated for net income inc it as well as for total returns, ret it , i.e. the sum of capital gains and net income. We both follow as calculated in equation (3) . This allows to test whether these implied rates exhibit the necessary cyclical properties to provide international risk sharing. However, it does not provide information on the size of the capital gains or income flows. We therefore employ a complementary method that consists of scaling returns by domestic GDP. This second measure allows to simultaneously explore whether returns exhibit the necessary cyclical properties and whether they are of sufficiently large size to generate income or wealth effects.
The coefficient γ can be interpreted as a cyclicality coefficient. It gives a first idea whether international risk sharing is functioning, that is whether net capital gains can provide an insurance against idiosyncratic output shocks. To allow risk sharing, the coefficient should be negative, i.e.
higher growth domestically should generate a net capital loss or a net income loss.
The interpretation of this cyclicality coefficient depends crucially on the method we use. By using implied rates of returns on foreign assets and liabilities, we test whether they have the correct sign to provide for risk sharing. By expressing returns as a ratio to GDP, we assess both the sign and the size of the returns. This allows to gauge the effect of financial globalisation on international The estimation includes country fixed effects α i and time fixed effects δ t so as to focus on the idiosyncratic part of GDP growth only. For both domestic and foreign growth rates, we use cyclical components so as to avoid capturing structural differences in growth levels. 13 This corresponds to theoretical concept of risk sharing as an insurance against volatility of output, not insurance against different average growth levels.
Our estimation also allows to examine whether the countercyclical behaviour of capital flows derives mainly from the asset or from the liabilities side. To do so, we disentangle equation (5) in the following asset and liability components:
where we again employ the two methods for measuring capital gains, that is by the implied rates of return and by scaling to domestic GDP. We estimate specifications (6) and (7) with first-order autoregressive disturbances (in order to adjust for persistence and auto-correlation in the error term) as well as heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Capital gains on foreign liabilities, which are losses to domestic residents and gains to foreign investors, need to be pro-cyclical in order to generate risk-sharing, and we thus expect γ L to be positive. Extending this reasoning to the rest of the world implies that capital gains on foreign assets should be pro-cyclical with GDP growth of the rest of the world, i.e. we expect also γ A to have a positive sign. 14 In the same way we run estimations for income flows and total investment returns.
Overall results
Starting with the estimation of rates of net capital gains, we find evidence that those act in a countercyclical way. The estimated cyclicality coefficient (-1.4) has the expected negative sign and is significant at the 10 percent level (Table 2) . Hence an increase in the cyclical component of domestic real GDP growth relative to the rest of the world co-moves negatively with the real rate 13 We use the residual of GDP growth obtained from an HP-filter with a λ = 6.25. This allows for focusing on the cyclical component of GDP growth rates. See Section 3.1 for details on the computation of GDP growth rates.
14 As we evaluate capital gains in domestic currency this can of course only hold if exchange rate movements do not distort the relation notably.
We omit time fixed effects in the estimation as we are now explicitly interested in global shocks.
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The result does not hold for investment income, as the coefficient has the desired sign but is not statistically significant. This suggests that net income on portfolio equity, on average, does not have the required countercyclical properties to act as a channel for risk sharing. One explanation of this result could be the corporate finance motivations behind dividend distribution, in particular the desire of firms to keep dividends relatively constant in the presence of fluctuations in profits.
For the rate of total returns (capital gains plus income), the estimated coefficient is again negative and significant (at the 10% level), implying that the capital gains channel dominates the investment income channel in this case.
Separating out the liability and the asset sides, we find rates of capital gains on the liabilities side to co-move with GDP growth with a coefficient of 1.7 (significant at the 1 percent level). This is consistent with the assumption in theoretical frameworks (see e.g. Davis, Nalewaik and Willen,
2001
) that domestic equity market returns tend to be procyclical. This result has the property of risk-sharing being "created"from within the economy, that is through domestic stock markets.
Also for the asset side, capital gains have the expected relation, as they positively co-move with GDP growth in the rest of the world, with a coefficient of 3.3 (significant at the 1 percent level). 15 This full set of results remains largely unchanged, but more significant, when we perform estimations on the returns scaled by GDP. Specifically, an increase of one percentage point in the GDP growth differential co-moves with a net capital loss of 0.15 percent of GDP (Table 3 , Panel A, significant at the 1% level). This implies a wealth transfer of 0.15 percent of GDP to the rest of the world when domestic GDP growth is increasing by one percentage point relative to the rest of the world. This does not hold for income flows, but for total returns where the estimated coefficient is negative and significant (-0.2).
Results for assets and liabilities are also very similar for this scaling method: for the liabilities side, we find capital gains to co-move with GDP growth with a coefficient of 0.18 (significant at the 5 percent level). Also for the asset side, capital gains have the expected relation that is required for risk sharing, as they positively co-move with rest of the world-GDP growth, with a coefficient of 0.4 (significant at the 1 percent level). In contrast to Table 2 , we do not see a significant positive coefficient on the liability side for total returns. This is probably driven by the significantly negative cyclicality coefficient on investment income outflows.
As a robustness check, we perform this last set of estimations again, adding two control variables, a time trend and total financial holdings (Table 3 , Panels B and C). These two control variables are important as their omission could create a bias in our estimation results. This is particularly true because capital gains and income flows, expressed as a ratio to GDP, have increased markedly over time, in line with holdings of foreign equity assets and liabilities. The relation between capital gains and the business cycle may therefore be instable over time. As for the time trend, we 15 The same mechanism also holds for the total returns. The coefficients on investment income, by contrast, are found to be insignificant on the asset side, whereas positive and significant on the liability side.
ECB Working Paper Series No 938 September 2008
observe significant values for some of the net and asset side estimations, confirming that capital gains have increased with time. Importantly, however, the estimated cyclicality coefficients remain largely unaffected, as their significance remains unchanged and their size changes only marginally.
Likewise, the inclusion of foreign equity assets and liabilities as a control variable does not affect our estimation results substantially.
Therefore, in conclusion, employing the control variables does not change our overall results notably. This is also consistent with the fact that our results in particular for capital gains and total returns are very much alike regardless of the method used.
Finally, we rerun the regressions for a number of subgroups, in particular industrial countries, euro area countries, and emerging market economies (Table 4 and Table 5 ). In Table 4 , net capital gains have the correct and significant signs only for the overall estimations, whereas they are significant for both the overall sample and industrial countries, when scaled by GDP (in Table 5 ).
For emerging markets, we do not observe significant cyclicality coefficients on net capital gains.
This might be severe for these countries as their output volatility tends to be much higher, and consequently benefits from financial integration could be very helpful in order to stabilise these economies.
By and large, we crucially find that international risk-sharing through cross-border equity seems feasible as cyclical, idiosyncratic fluctuations in GDP growth rates are at least partly off-set by net capital gains on foreign equity investment positions. However, variations in net income flows do not seem to be related in any significant way to output shocks, suggesting that the potential for consumption smoothing through such flows is severely limited.
Developments in cyclicality over time
With growing financial integration, it seems natural that the behaviour of capital gains and income flows has changed over time. To explore such changes over time, we perform, as a first check, estimations over a subsample running from 1993 to 2005, covering the years of enhanced international financial integration as observed above. Table 4 reports results based on implied rates of capital gains. The cyclicality coefficient γ turns out to be modestly higher in the subsample 1993-2005 than for the full sample. In particular the coefficient on foreign assets increased from 3.3 to 6.2 and the coefficient on net capital gains changes from -1.4 to -1.8. This suggest that risk sharing possibilities have improved in the last decade.
The results for capital gains scaled to GDP are reported in Table 5 . Also for this measure, there has been a marked increase in the cyclicality coefficient throughout the sample. For the full set of countries, the coefficient increases (in absolute terms) from -0.15 over the whole sample to -0.21 over the more recent sub-sample. Similar results hold for assets and liabilities separately, as well as for the different country groupings (in particular industrial countries).
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For a more refined analysis of trends over time, we run a specification where the cyclicality coefficient γ t is allowed to change over time. We do so by re-running the regressions over rolling five year-periods. 16 The resulting γ-coefficients are reported in Figures 4 and 5 . 17 The results confirm that the cyclicality of capital gains has changed markedly over time, and in particular that the average response of those gains to output shocks has increased over time. Repeating this exercise for investment income, we find very different results (see Figure 6 for implied income yields and Figure 7 for income scaled to GDP). Overall, net investment income (Panel A) was broadly countercyclical until the 1990s, although at very low levels. After that, the coefficients have moved even closer to zero, suggesting that barely any co-movement has taken place. In Figure 7 , we actually see for industrial countries a trend towards very limited procyclicality of net income flows after 2000, whereas counter-cyclicality is observable for emerging markets. Separate results on assets and liabilities (Panels B and C) confirm that coefficients are very small, without clear trends over time.
Explaining the cyclical properties of capital gains
The next step of our empirical exercise is to test whether variations in home bias and in financial market depth help explain the cyclical properties of the ratio of net capital gains to GDP. To do so, we rerun estimations (5) - (7), imposing a structure on γ that depends on home bias and financial deepening. 18 We let
16 These estimations are pooled to avoid possible distortions to the estimates arising from the very short time spans. 17 In the figures, the γt coefficient plotted for a given year t corresponds to an estimate over the five-year period between t − 4 and t. For presentational purposes, the coefficients are smoothed using the Lowess-method with a bandwidth of 0.8. 18 In these estimations we scale capital gains by GDP in order to explicitly capture the effect of the increasing magnitude of international financial markets.
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where HB it and HB * it are the home bias of the domestic economy and the rest of the world, respectively, and M CAP it and M CAP * it refer to domestic and world stock market capitalisation relative to domestic and world GDP. Obviously, we impose a structure containing domestic variables for capital gains on foreign liabilities estimations and global variables for the foreign asset side. For the estimation, home bias in international equity is measured following French and Poterba (1991) as:
where A it is the foreign asset position in portfolio equity and W it equals M CAP it + A it − L it , corresponding to domestic wealth in terms of portfolio equity. Hence, if HB it equals zero there is no home bias in the investment strategy of the investing country, i.e. country i's investment in its own stock market is in line with the share of the domestic to the global stock market. Conversely, we define a somewhat less conventionally used measure, the international home bias from country i's perspective (i.e. the aggregate home bias of the rest of the world on its investment in country i), as:
where W W t represents global wealth in terms of portfolio equity and is computed as the sum of all W it in our sample, that is global wealth in terms of portfolio equity. Table 6 presents the estimation results. The first row shows that the cyclicality of capital gains on foreign equity liabilities has a highly significant γ L -coefficient of more than unity, but international home bias has a negative effect on the procyclicality of the foreign liability side. The second row highlights that, if we additionally include domestic stock market capitalisation (as a proxy for financial deepening), results are again very significant: A one percentage point increase in the stock market to GDP ratio increases the cyclicality coefficient by 0.01. 19 Regarding capital gains on foreign assets we impose a structure with equivalent variables (third and fourth rows). These are the home bias when investing abroad as well as global stock market capitalisation. Both variables are significant with coefficients of about -1 for home bias and 2.4 for global stock market capitalisation, again suggesting that financial deepening is beneficial for international risk-sharing.
Finally we impose the same structure on the estimation of γ for net capital gains (fifth and sixth rows). Both in the estimation with and without stock market capitalisation, the estimated coefficient γ suggests counter-cyclicality with a coefficient close to -1. The structural variables are not significant in this estimation suggesting that they off-set each other.
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5 Consumption risk sharing
Overall empirical evidence
After having analysed the cyclicality of capital gains and income, we turn to evaluate actual risk sharing in terms of consumption. Following Lewis (1996) , we are interested in determining to what extent consumption paths are buffered from output shocks. As described above findings in the literature suggests a rather low degree of risk sharing. Our empirical strategy in order to evaluate the extent of consumption smoothing involves the standard risk sharing equation:
where c it and y it are the cyclical components of consumption and output growth, respectively. It is crucial to include time fixed effects (δ t ) in order to isolate the idiosyncratic parts of consumption and output growth. Table 7 , Panel A), we find values for β to be high and significantly different from zero (0.73 for the complete sample), suggesting that consumption risk sharing is not perfect. Employing country fixed effects does not have a significant impact in this estimation as we use cyclical components. 21 For consistency reasons we only include observations of the years that were available for the cyclicality analysis of net capital gains.
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of international financial integration -see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004 ) as well as holdings of different asset classes (e.g. portfolio equity, FDI etc.). We verify these results for our dataset by running run equation (11) once more with the imposed structure
where F OEQ it measures the sum of foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities divided by nominal GDP (Panel B). Augmenting with this specific measure of financial openness, we observe for the subgroup of industrial countries a significant positive effect (indicated by a coefficient of -0.5, significant at the 1% level) of de facto portfolio equity integration on consumption risk sharing (as also identified by Sørensen et al., 2007) . For emerging market economies, however, no evidence for a beneficial effect of cross-border investments is found (in line with Kose et al., 2007) .
While these estimations reproduce results that have already been identified in the literature our main contribution to the risk sharing literature is to explicitly introduce the potential channels of international risk-sharing as identified above: the capital gains channel and income flows. In line with the analysis of this paper we focus on portfolio equity investments. Thus, we impose for example the following structure on the risk sharing coefficient:
where γ kg are the set of country-by-country cyclicality estimates of net capital gains from the portfolio equity category. We estimate these in a first step by running the country-by-country equivalent specifications of (5) to (7) . Using the cyclicality coefficients in the augmentation of the traditional risk sharing equation allows us to observe if countries that exhibit for international risk sharing desirable cyclicality patterns, are also the countries with improved consumption risk sharing properties. 22 We also run specification with the cyclicality estimations on capital gains on assets and liabilities separately. In other specifications we use the coefficients on net investment income to investigate the impact of dividend payments and total returns to examine the joint impact of capital gains and dividends. 23 Regarding net capital gains and income flows, we expect β 2 to have a positive sign, i.e. to bring the overall risk sharing coefficient closer to 0, if the associated cyclicality coefficients are negative. In line with analysis of the previous section we expect a negative sign on β 2 for the asset and liability side estimations.
Our results in Table 7 shows that we find the expected coefficients for the overall sample and industrial countries. This holds for both the cyclicality coefficients on net capital gains (Panel C) as well as for capital gains on foreign assets or liabilities (Panel D and E, respectively). Hence, we have established that countries with the required cyclical properties regarding capital gains 22 The cyclicality estimates are time invariant for each country. We weight by the in the country-by-country estimation obtained t-statistics. 23 We use the cyclicality coefficients from the specification where capital gains are measured as a ratios to GDP.
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September 2008 experience significantly higher international risk sharing. For the Euro Area sample however, we find significant β 2 -coefficients in the opposite direction, whereas no significant results are found for emerging markets (except for the coefficient on capital gains on foreign assets).
As a next step we consider the cyclical properties of net investment income as a driver of consumption risk sharing. Results on β 2 suggest for the overall and industrial sample that countries with more counter-cyclical net investment income flows also experience more consumption smoothing (Panel F). Coefficients are less significant than the ones for net capital gains, however. Also, we should bear in mind that the overall panel results in the previous section did not indicate countercyclicality for net investment income flows. For the coefficients on total returns on portfolio equity we do not observe a a positive impact on international risk sharing (Panel G).
Overall, one can infer from this analysis that industrial countries benefit from financial globalisation in terms of improved risk sharing, whereas emerging markets do not. This finding holds both in our first-step cyclicality analysis as well as in the consumption risk sharing analysis. 24 
Estimating risk sharing over time
The next step in the analysis is the exploration of possible trends over time. We rerun the regressions for the time period from 1993 -2005 in order to capture the recent time period of financial globalisation. 25 Noticeably, for our overall sample there is an improvement in international risksharing (Table 8 Regarding the channels of risk sharing, we find less evidence compared to the full time period.
The overall coefficient on β 2 is significant only at the 10% level, whereas it is not significant for industrial countries. Also the coefficients for investment income flows are not significant for this time period. Hence, for example among industrial countries, the observed increased consumption risk sharing is not significantly higher for countries with more counter-cyclical net capital gains.
However, in Table 5 , we observed improved counter-cyclicality of net capital gains for this group.
Thus, either differences among industrial countries with regard to their cyclicality patterns have diminished or other cross-country differences play a more important role for consumption risk sharing. 24 A similar pattern is found in the literature on the effects of financial globalisation on output growth, where e.g. Kose et al. (2006) suggest that countries need to pass a certain threshold in their development in order to benefit from financial globalisation. This paper has reviewed one of the real economy implications of growing financial integration, namely international risk sharing. The basic intuition behind risk sharing through financial markets is that international portfolio diversification helps to reduce volatility on investment returns, which in turn helps smooth variations in income and in consumption across countries.
The main question of interest in this paper was to understand whether such risk sharing is functioning in practice, and, if so, through which channels. We have examined specifically the role of capital gains versus that of income on international securities, with a focus on portfolio equity for both theoretical reasons and practical reasons.
The dataset allows to check whether capital gains and income help smooth income in the face of idiosyncratic output shocks. Our empirical strategy has proceeded in two stages: first, do A final outcome of our empirical analysis is that results usually hold best for industrial countries.
For emerging market economies, we find only very limited evidence for risk sharing behaviour through capital gains on international portfolio holdings. Capital gains are small and do not react in any significant way to output shocks; also, their impact on consumption seems to be insignificant.
The most straightforward explanation for this negative result would be that financial markets in emerging market economies, especially the equity securities market that we examine in this paper, are on average too small to act as channel for consumption risk sharing.
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September 2008 Finally, various extensions of our work are possible. One such extension would be to repeat the exercise for different types of asset holdings, in particular foreign direct investment and debt. This would allow to form a more complete picture of risk sharing through international capital markets, but such an exercise would run into significant data problems, given that reliable estimates of capital gains on these other asset categories are difficult to construct. Another avenue for further refinement would be to examine the behaviour of bilateral risk sharing and the role of bilateral security holdings therein. More broadly, the dataset we have constructed may be useful to examine a range of empirical questions on international capital gains, such as the asset price implications Notes: The dependent variables are the real rates of capital gains, investment income and total returns on foreign equity assets and liabilities, respectively. The explanatory variables are the cyclical component of the domestic real GDP growth rate (for regressions on liabilities), of the rest of the world real GDP growth rate (assets) and the differential between the two (net positions), respectively. See text for definitions of all variables and explanations on the expected signs. Estimation by least squares with AR(1) disturbances ( (1) and (2)) and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) (3), respectively, and involving country and time fixed effects (except for (2)). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Control variables
Notes: The dependent variables are capital gains, investment income and returns on foreign equity assets and liabilities (scaled by nominal GDP), respectively. The explanatory variables are the cyclical component of the domestic real GDP growth rate (for regressions on liabilities), of the rest of the world real GDP growth rate (assets) and the differential between the two (net positions), respectively. Panel B includes a time trend, Financial holdings in Panel C is the ratio of total foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities to GDP. See text for definitions of all variables and explanations on the expected signs. Estimation by least squares with AR(1) disturbances ( (1) and (2)) and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) (3), respectively, and involving country and time fixed effects (except for (2)). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Notes: Estimations as in Table 2 . Full regression outputs are available upon request. Table 3 . Full regression outputs are available upon request. 
Capital gains Capital gains

Interaction terms with real GDP growth
Notes: Estimations as in Table 3 , augmented with interaction terms of real GDP growth with home bias of the investing country (HB ), home bias of the rest of the world (HB W ), domestic stock market capitalisation as a ratio to GDP (MCAP ) and stock market capitalisation in the rest of the world (MCAP W ). Full regression outputs are available upon request. Notes: The dependent variables is the cyclical component of consumption growth, ß and β 1 denote the coefficient on the cyclical component of output growth. Financial equity holdings is the ratio of total foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities to GDP. β 2 denotes the coefficient on the country-by-country cyclicality coefficient of net capital gains, capital gains on liabilities, capital gains on assets, net investment income flows and net total returns on international portfolio equity investments (as ratios to GDP ), respectively. See text for definitions of all variables. Estimation by least squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) and involving time fixed effects. ***, ** ,* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
